

ÚJV Řež, a. s.

# Severe accidents: definitions, parameters calculations & equipment qualification

Miroslav Kotouč Jiří Duspiva Tomáš Janda **Dept. of Severe Accidents and Thermomechanics** 


**Equipment Qualification in Nuclear Installations,** 20-23 May 2019, UJV Rez, CZECH REPUBLIC



























- 1. Definition of a severe accident (SA)
- 2. Processes in the course of a SA
- 3. Management & mitigation of SAs
- 4. Structures, systems & components (SSC) during a SA
- 5. Codes for SA analyses
- 6. Assessment of outcomes of SA analyses
- 7. Equipment qualification for SAs



#### 2


### SA definition

### Severe accident

• "Accident with substantial core damage"

### • Former terminology

- Design basis accidents (DBAs)
- Beyond design basis accidents (BDBAs)
  - incl. SAs
- Actual terminology (IAEA, WENRA)
  - Design basis conditions (DBCs)
  - Design extension conditions (DECs)
    - DEC-A complex sequences (w/o core melt)
    - DEC-B SAs (core melt)







### Processes in the course of a SA (1)






### **Unmitigated SA**

- Phase just after an initiating event (IE) identical to DBAs
  - initiated by e.g. loss of cooling accident (LOCA), station blackout (SBO)...
- Core degradation = consequence of the absence of core cooling
  - Cladding oxidation exothermic process, H<sub>2</sub> production
  - Cladding rupture release of gaseous and highly volatile fission products (FPs)
  - Loss of fuel geometry release of moderately volatile FPs
  - Fuel relocation into the lower plenum (LP) ⇒ reactor pressure vessel (RPV) ablation ⇒ RPV integrity loss ⇒ debris/molten materials (corium) release into the reactor cavity
    - High-pressure melt ejection (HPME) aerosols dispersion into the containment (CTMT) volume
    - Low-pressure melt ejection "slow" release of debris/corium into the pit
  - Molten core-concrete interaction (MCCI) release of nonvolatile FPs, H<sub>2</sub> production








### Processes in the course of a SA (2)



#### • Challenges for the CTMT

- Pressurization steam, H<sub>2</sub> and non-condensable gases
- Over-heating
- Radiation gaseous FPs, aerosols & vapors






## **Management & mitigation of SAs**



### • SA management (SAM)

- Coolant injection into the core
- Corium confinement:
  - In-vessel melt retention (IVMR)
  - Ex-vessel corium cooling
- Long-term CTMT heat removal
- Over-pressurization mitigation measures
- FPs confinement



- SSCs intended for the above-mentioned functions:
  - Need of qualification?
  - To which conditions?







- **Question?** which SSCs are being used in the course of SAs? For:
  - Unmitigated SAs vs.
  - SAs with SAM application
- Answer! determined by the SA evolution
  - A *bunch* of scenarios must be analyzed
- SSCs used in the course of SAs:
  - **1.** Systems for physical parameters/plant state measurement
  - 2. Components for SA mitigation
    - Primary circuit (PC) depressurization measures
    - Systems for in-core coolant injection
    - Passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs)
    - Core-catcher
    - Valves
    - Mobile devices



### SSCs during a SA



- **1.** Systems for physical parameters/plant state measurement
  - Core exit temperature (CET) used for determination of the entrance into SA management guidelines (SAMGs)
    - Low range; will be destroyed after core degradation onset; no qualification
  - PC loops temperatures used for determination of the entrance into SAMGs
    - Low range; will be destroyed after core degradation onset; no qualification
  - Liquid level in spent fuel pool (SFP), steam generators (SGs), CTMT sump
    - Possibility of clogging ⇒ measurement devices need to be qualified
  - Pressure in the CTMT qualified for DBCs, wider range in SAs
  - H<sub>2</sub> concentration in CTMT qualified for DBCs, wider range in SAs; low O<sub>2</sub> conc.!!!
  - Dose rate in CTMT
    - Data acquired during normal operation, in SAs used alternatively if CET unavailable
    - Qualification to higher ranges of dose rates (to capture EOPs ⇒ SAMGs)
  - Radioactivity (RA) release into environment
    - Outside CTMT; no qualification
- Generally: qualification needed for cables and those devices which help to identify whether a certain system's operation is hampered by clogging




### SSCs during a SA



#### 2. Components for SA mitigation

- PC depressurization PORV, SRV
  - Periodical operation, very hot gases carrying aerosols
- Systems for in-core coolant injection
  - Localized outside the CTMT, however, water intake from the sump ⇒ liquid is likely to contain much aerosols
- PARs
  - Designed for SAs
- Core-catcher
  - Designed for SAs
- Valves
  - Steam dump to atmosphere valve
- Mobile devices
  - Located outside the CTMT





• Generally: qualification needed in order to be able to carry out the required functions during SAs



### **Codes for SA analyses**



#### • Integral codes

- IE ⇒ SA progression ⇒ FPs release into environment (source term; ST)
- "Lumped parameter" approach
- FPs behavior (release from fuel  $\Rightarrow$  transport in circuits  $\Rightarrow$  behavior in CTMT  $\Rightarrow$  ST)
- FPs grouping into "classes"
  - Similar chemical behavior

### • Main integral codes:

- MELCOR
  - Sandia National Laboratories
  - for US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- ASTEC
  - IRSN+GRS
- MAAP5
  - for EPRI
- SOCRAT
  - IBRAE

Class	Class	Chemical Group	Representative	Member Elements
	Name			
1	XE	Noble Gas	Xe	He, Ne, Ar, Kr, Xe, Rn, H, N
2	CS	Alkali Metals	Cs	Li, Na, K, Rb, Cs, Fr, Cu
3	BA	Alkaline Earths	Ва	Be, Mg, Ca, Sr, Ba, Ra, Es, Fm
4	12	Halogens	I <sub>2</sub>	F, Cl, Br, I, At
5	TE	Chalcogens	Те	O, S, Se, Te, Po
6	RU	Platinoids	Ru	Ru, Rh, Pd, Re, Os, Ir, Pt, Au, Ni
7	MO	Early Transition Elements	Мо	V, Cr, Fe, Co, Mn, Nb, Mo, Tc, Ta, W
8	CE	Tetravalent	Ce	Ti, Zr, Hf, Ce, Th, Pa, Np, Pu, C
9	LA	Trivalents	La	Al, Sc, Y, La, Ac, Pr, Nd, Pm, Sm, Eu, Gd, Tb, Dy, Ho, Er, Tm, Yb, Lu, Am, Cm, Bk, Cf
10	UO2	Uranium	UO <sub>2</sub>	U
11	CD	More Volatile Main Group	Cd	Cd, Hg, Zn, As, Sb, Pb, Tl, Bi
12	AG	Less Volatile Main Group	Ag	Ga, Ge, In, Sn, Ag
13	BO2	Boron	BO <sub>2</sub>	B, Si, P
16	CSI	Cesium iodide	Csl	Csl
17	CSM	Cesium Molybdate	CsM <sup>1</sup>	CsM <sup>1</sup>



### **Codes for SA analyses**



- Main output variables from SA computational analyses in relation with EQ – temporal evolution of:
  - p in CTMT ۲
  - T in CTMT
  - Gas composition entering the CTMT or environment
  - Humidity in the CTMT
  - Surface T of solid structures
  - Occurrence of deflagrations
  - **FPs distribution**

#### Still missing as an outcome from integral SA analyses:

- Dose rates acting on SSCs
- Recent analyses at UJV Rez:
  - MELCOR analysis  $\Rightarrow$  FPs distribution in the reactor hall of VVER-1000 reactor  $\bullet$ CTMT  $\Rightarrow$  MCNP5 evaluation of dose rate at 2 spots (RA measurement probes)
    - for a SA in open reactor & SFP (no CET measurement): EOPs ⇒ SAMGs
  - MELCOR analysis ⇒ FPs distribution in the reactor hall of VVER-1000 reactor CTMT  $\Rightarrow$  MAVRIC/ORIGEN-S evaluation






- Typical temporal evolution of crucial parameters for an unmitigated SA
  example:
  - VVER-1000/320 (Temelin NPP)
  - IE: large break LOCA + SBO
  - CTMT failure by over-pressurization not considered
  - MCCI ongoing
  - PARs taken into account



(2)


• CTMT pressure








• CTMT atmosphere temperature, dew point temperature







• Concentration of steam, H<sub>2</sub>, O<sub>2</sub> and N<sub>2</sub> in the CTMT atmosphere




Time [day]






• Relative humidity in the CTMT atmosphere







• Surface temperature of a solid structure in the reactor hall



### **Equipment qualification for SAs**



- 2014: project for EQ for both Czech NPPs
  - 4x VVER-440/213 Dukovany NPP
  - 2x VVER-1000/320 Temelin NPP)
- Identified were:
  - Equipment to be qualified
  - Relevant SA scenarios
  - Readings of maxima of decisive parameters, such as:
    - Atmosphere & component surface temperature
    - Pressure
    - Humidity
    - Water level
    - Hydrogen deflagration identification
    - RNs distribution (vapors, aerosols and gases)
      - in the air
      - in sumps and
      - settled on structures
- For SAs, crucial is the dose rate evaluation
  - up to several days of duration
- <sup>17</sup> new methodology under development, using the code SCALE/MAVRIC seq.







## **Thank You for Your Attention!**

#### **UJV GROUP**

